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## What is this talk about?

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## **Agenda**

#### What is SharePoint?

→ Demo SharePoint

#### **SharePoint Web Security**

→ Demo XSS and CSRF

#### **Hardening Considerations**

→ Demo Hidden List and REST API

Conclusion

Quiz and Q&A








## The Voting Device

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## The Voting



### Let's give it a try...







## What is SharePoint?

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
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#### What is SharePoint?




#### Browser-based collaboration and content management platform

The latest release of the product is SharePoint 2013



## **Terminology**





Web Application

**Site Collection** 

Site

**Subsite** 

List

**Custom List** 


**Document Library** 

**Web Parts** 

Apps


## Web Application, Site Collection, Site





### Web Application, Site Collection, Site






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#### **Document Libraries**




#### **Document Libraries contain files:**



#### **Lists and Custom Lists**



#### Lists and Custom Lists contain structured information:




## **Web Part Pages**



A web site in SharePoint is built with Web Part Pages


Web Part Pages host Web Parts and App Parts on a given layout



#### **Web Parts**



#### Web Parts render data from Doc. Libraries, Lists and other sources



### **Apps**



Apps do the same as Web Parts, but are much more limited.

Apps do not allow any code behind to access SharePoint serverside objects.

Apps can create Lists and Doc Libraries, but they are stored in a dedicated Site Collection on a different domain.

Apps are isolated on client side in iFrames (The Same Origin Policy prevents access to the data of your web site).

### **Apps**



Apps do the same as Web Parts, but are much more limited.

Apps do not allow any code behind to access \$\infty\$

Apps can create Lists and Doc Libraies, but they are st dedicated Site Collection and a different subdomain. ut they are stored in a

n client side in iFrames (The Same Origin Policy access to the data of your web site).

- ==> To make it easier for end-users, Microsoft now calls everything an app, but technically this is not true.
- ==> Built-in "apps" like Tasks, Contacts or Calendar are not isolated in a dedicated site collection.

## **Site Templates**



		<u> </u>	
Туре	Name	Description	
Collaboration	Team Site	A place to work together with a group of people.	
	Project Site	A site for managing and collaborating on a project.	
Publishing	Publishing Portal	A starter hierarchy for an Internet-facing site or a large intranet portal.	
	Enterprise Wiki	A site for publishing knowledge that you capture and want to share.	

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#### **Demo: Team Sites**


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## Web Site (Publishing Portal)




#### Internet-facing Web Sites are published for Anonymous Users:



## Web Site (Publishing Portal)



#### Editors use an internal URL to author the content:



#### **Demo: Public Web Site**





#### Oceanic Airlines

Flight 815

The Island

The DHARMA Initiative

Searc

#### Flight 815

**Flight 815** was a scheduled flight from <u>Sydney</u>, <u>Australia</u> to <u>Los Angeles</u>, <u>California</u>, <u>United States</u>, on a <u>Boeing 777</u>. On <u>September 22</u>, <u>2004</u>, the airliner, carrying 324 passengers, deviated from its original course and disappeared over the Pacific Ocean. This is the central moment in the series <u>Lost</u> and the personal chronological beginning of the <u>main characters</u>' exploits on <u>the Island</u>.

Flight 815's breakup and crash was due to <u>Desmond Hume</u> failing to enter <u>a code</u> into <u>the Swan</u> station computer, causing a large burst of <u>electromagnetic</u> energy. The true cause of the plane's off-course deviation and arrival to the Island's airspace was <u>Jacob</u>, the supernatural entity who protected the Island. Jacob brought the plane because many of the flight's passengers were <u>candidates</u> to replace him as protector.



John Locke



Claire Littleton

Jack Shephard



Walt Lloyd

Two months after the crash, wreckage was found in the <u>Sunda Trench</u> in the Indian Ocean near Bapassengers were presumed dead. In reality, however, the discovered wreckage was staged by <u>Cl</u>
The real plane had suffered a <u>mid-air break-up</u> and crashed on an uncharted <u>Island</u>, with more to and 2 crew members surviving the crash itself. Later, six of those survivors made it off the Island known as the <u>Oceanic Six</u>.

By late 2007, the Island's treacherous conditions and the violent battles between passengers, the inhabitants, and other factions killed nearly every passenger on the plane. As of *Lost's* finale epison Austen, Hugo "Hurley" Reyes, James "Sawyer" Ford, Walt Lloyd, Rose Nadler, Bernard Nadler, Clauma, and Zach were still be alive. Cindy Chandler was the only crew member of the flight to sur





## **SharePoint Web Security**


**Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** 

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## **Cross-Site Scripting**



With Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities, attackers are able to execute JavaScript code in the users' context



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## **Cross-Site Scripting – Threats**

CC) APASS SECURITY

Stealing user sessions (cookie value) to gain access to the application.



Usually not relevant on SharePoint Web Applications (Windows Integrated Authentication or HttpOnly Flag set).


However, cookies of other applications on the same domain can be stolen.

### **Cross-Site Scripting – Threats**



Sending requests on behalf of the currently logged in user.


On SharePoint 2013 the JavaScript Client-Side Object Model (CSOM) allows comfortable access to all the data stored in SharePoint.



## **Cross-Site Scripting – Navigation**



#### Default SharePoint Features: Navigation Links (2010 only)





# Default SharePoint Features: Web Parts (e.g. Script / Content Editor Web Parts)



Team Sites

Big Bang Theory

IT Crowd

EDIT LINKS

XSS

Home

Documents

Subsites

Big Bang Theory

IT Crowd

XSS

Site Contents


EDIT LINKS

## Cross-Site Scripting Test Page

This is a sample script about how to insert JavaScript code in SharePoint 2013 Web Part Pages

Show Alert


Content Editor



## **Cross-Site Scripting – ASP.NET Pages**




# Default SharePoint Features: ASP.NET / Web Part Pages (Edit or upload .aspx page)





#### **Pre-Conditions I:**

- → Users with sufficient permissions can include JavaScript by Design
- "Add & Customize Pages" Permission is required
- Add and Customize Pages Add, change, or delete HTML pages or Web Part Pages, and edit the Web site using a Microsoft SharePoint Foundation-compatible editor.
  - ♦ Not included in "Contribute" permission level and below (Since SP 2010)
  - → Included in "Designer" and "Full Control" permission levels



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#### **Pre-Conditions II:**

→ Only applied consequently if Web Part Security Setting is not changed:

Scriptable Web Parts

Specify whether to allow contributors to edit scriptable Web Parts.

- O Allows contributors to add or edit scriptable Web Parts.
- Prevent contributors from adding or editing scriptable Web Parts.
- ★ And Web Parts are declared correctly in the web.config


```
<SafeControl ... TypeName="*" Safe="True" SafeAgainstScript="False" ... />
<SafeControl ... TypeName="ListViewWebPart" Safe="True" SafeAgainstScript="True" ... />
<SafeControl ... TypeName="XsltListViewWebPart" Safe="True" SafeAgainstScript="True" ... />
<SafeControl ... TypeName="ImageWebPart" Safe="True" SafeAgainstScript="True" ... />
<SafeControl ... TypeName="PageViewerWebPart" Safe="True" SafeAgainstScript="True" ... />
<SafeControl ... TypeName="PictureLibrarySlideshowWebPart" Safe="True" SafeAgainstScript="True" ... />
...
```



	Permission Level	SharePoint Version	Web Part Security Setting	SafeAgainstScript
	Full Control (Owner)	2007 and older	N/A	N/A
		2010 and newer	Allow Contributors	True
				False
			Prevent Contributors	True
				False
Cor	Contribute (Member)	2007 and older	N/A	N/A
		2010 and newer	Allow Contributors	True
				False
			Prevent Contributors	True
••••				False



#### Trying to inject JavaScript code as Contributor without permissions



## Cross-Site Scripting – Web Sensitive Files



Web Sensitive Files can be used to embed malicious content like JavaScript

Therefore only users with "Add & Customize Pages" permissions are allowed to add and modify Web Sensitive Files

By default, Web Sensitive Files are:

- → ascx
- → asmx
- ★ Aspx (ASP.NET pages)
- → Jar (Java)
- + master
- → Swf (Flash)
- → xap
- → xsf
- → xsn

## Cross-Site Scripting – Web Sensitive Files



The Web Sensitive File Types are not complete. Other dangerous files like .html can be uploaded without the "Add & Customize Pages" permission

However, SharePoint Setting "Browser File Handling" prevents the browser from automatically render malicious files by default:

Browser File Handling

O Permissive


Specifies whether
additional security
headers are added to

- ◆ <u>Strict:</u> Content-Disposition Header is set on every file type to force the file to be downloaded instead of rendering it in the browser.
- → <u>Permissive:</u> Some file types, like \*.html are rendered in the browser. If these files contain javascript it gets executed in the context of SharePoint.

## Cross-Site Scripting – Web Sensitive Files



# Trying to upload ASP.NET page with JavaScript code as Contributor without permissions




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# Trying to download malicious HTML page uploaded by a Contributor



## **Cross-Site Scripting – Mitigation**



#### Minimal trustful Owners:

- → Only provide Owner permission level to trustful users
- → Do not allow everyone to own a Site
- → Disable Self-Site Creation or at least limit it to a dedicated domain.

## **Careful Configuration:**

- → Do not allow untrusted users to "Add & Customize Pages" (Custom Permission Levels)
- Do not allow Contributors to use Web Parts not declared as "SafeAgainstScripts" (Web Part Security Settings)
- → Do not change the "SafeAgainstScripts"-declaration of preinstalled Web Parts (Web Config Settings)
- → Do not misconfigure the list of Web Sensitive Files
- → Do not misconfigure the Browser File Handling

## **Cross-Site Scripting – Mitigation**



## 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Code:

- ◆ Check correct declaration of 3<sup>rd</sup> party Web Parts which by design allow to embed JavaScript ("SafeAgainstScript=false")
- → Test 3<sup>rd</sup> party Web Parts declared as "SafeAgainstScript", if they do not accidently allow embedding of JavaScript (XSS Vulnerability)





## **SharePoint Web Security**

**Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)** 

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## **Cross-Site Request Forgery**



An attacker must not be able to predict a valid request, which could be used to trick a victim to execute a given action in the already authenticated context. E.g.:

- Submitting a form to add a new user
- Submitting a form to delete a document

**+** ...

Common best practice is to include an unpredictable element within every request which triggers immediate actions

This so called "Anti-XSRF" token should be included in every important html form

## **Cross-Site Request Forgery**



An attacker must not be able to predict a valid request, which could be used to trick a victim to execute a given action in the already authenticated context. E.g.:

- Submitting a form to add a noneSubmitting a form to divide a loculien

Common best practice is to include an unpredictable elementation within every request which triggers immediate actions

This so Cale \*\* April 1995\*\*\* unpredictable element

**KSRF"** token should be included in every important html form

## **Cross-Site Request Forgery**



### Web Page Security Validation = Anti-XSRF Token


Web Page Security Validation Security validations expire after a configurable amount of time, requiring the user to retry his operation.	Security validation is:  On Off  Security validation expires:  After  Never	30	minutes
--	---	----	---------

This feature is enabled by default on every ASP.NET page based on a SharePoint Master Page

3<sup>rd</sup> party solutions, which do not inherit from the SharePoint Master Page, must include the "FormDigest" control and check it by calling the "ValidateFormDigest" method before they execute an action

## **DEMO: Cross-Site Request Forgery**





Original request Edited i Params Headers Raw

Cache-Control: no-cac

MINIMALDOWNLOAD=1& Pn ShowSettings=False VENTTARGET=& EVENTAR Command=&SPPageStateC nager ExitingDesignMo =& wzSelected=&MSOSPW OSPWebPartManager End ItemUser=1& VIEWSTAT qpPXJZ6CxMk3oOqZJBO%3 HolderMain%24wikiPage EC2D8C6152986DB9D1552 20-0000 CALLBACKID A\$222013-06-25T11\$3A4 2StartingNodeTitle%22

Google

EDIT LINKS

🔔 There was a problem. Some of your changes may have been saved. The security validation for this page is invalid. Click Back in your Web browser, refresh the page, and try your operation again.

urce=&MSOT1Pn SelectedWpId=&MSOT1Pn View=0&MSOT1 erString=&MSOT1Pn Button=none& wikiPageMode=& E OAC EditDuringWorkflow=&InputComments=& wikiPage artManager DisplayModeName=Browse&MSOSPWebPartMa youtChanges=&MSOLayout InDesignMode=& wpSelected PWebPartManager StartWebPartEditingName=false&MS lPosition=0&SPPageStateContext PreviousAuthoring YmE4NSO2YzcyMjRiYTZjN2Nk3poO2JRzjsYghVo1fZQXyD9d 100%24ct147=&=Search%20this%20site&ct100%24Place C30729C55FAA9E94B290D83414710D5927C08CB780EF013E D6CD55F53B10047%2C25%2OJun%2O2O13%2O11%3A45%3AO2 chMenu& CALLBACKPARAM=Save%3A%7B%22Version%22%3 22%3A0%2C%22StartingNodeKey%22%3A%221025%22%2C%2 \$3A\$22\$2Fsites\$2Fteams\$22\$2C\$22SPWebPrefix\$22\$3A





## **SharePoint Web Security**

**SQL** Injection

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# The default pages and web parts of SharePoint are most likely not vulnerable to SQL Injection attacks

## However, 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Solutions need to be checked carefully

- → Which data sources do these pages / web parts use?
- Do they access the database?
- Do they use Stored Procedures / Prepared Statements?
- **+** ...







## **Hardening Considerations**

**Lockdown Anonymous Access** 

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# Lockdown mode is a Site Collection Feature that you can use to secure published sites:



Limited-access user permission lockdown mode

When this feature is enabled, permissions for users in the "limited access" permissions level (such as Anonymous Users) are reduced, preventing access to Application Pages.

Deactivate

Active

By enabling lockdown mode on a site, you can remove unnecessary permissions for anonymous users.



Oceanic Airlines

Flight 815

The Island

The DHARMA Initiative



# When lockdown mode is turned on, fine-grain permissions for the limited access permission level are reduced:

Permission	Limited access — default	Limited access — lockdown mode
List permissions: View Application Pages	Yes	No
Site permissions: Browse User Information	Yes	Yes
Site permissions: Use Remote Interfaces	Yes	No
Site permissions: Use Client Integration Features	Yes	Yes
Site permissions: Open	Yes	Yes

- Removes the permission to access application pages like
   \_layouts/viewlsts.aspx, which can be used to shows all available lists in a site
- Removes the permission to use remote interfaces like SOAP and REST API




## View lists as authenticated user (e.g. Editor):





### View lists as anonymous user (not authorized):



==> Access still possible with Remote Interfaces if Web Application is poorly configured!





## Hardening Considerations

**Remote Interfaces** 

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
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### Remote Interfaces - SOAP



#### **Traditional SharePoint SOAP Web Services:**

- <site>/\_vti\_bin/lists.asmx
- < <site>/\_vti\_bin/sites.asmx
- **+** ...




## **Remote Interfaces - CSOM**



## **Client-Side Object Model CSOM:**

- Client Applications can use the web service <site>/\_vti\_bin/client.svc to access the SharePoint Object Model
- They provide better performance because they batch requests and perform all operations asynchronously
- → The semantics are more familiar and easier to be used for SharePoint developers




## Remote Interfaces – CSOM + REST




#### The CSOM can be used with...

- → JavaScript or .NET APIs
- ★ REST Endpoints on URL: <site>/\_api (new in SP 2013)






## Passenger Information is pulled from a list called "Passenger List"






## Trying to access Passenger List as Editor (sensitive information)





## Trying to access Passenger List as Anonymous User





### Access Passenger List with CSOM REST API:


- http://oceanic.csnclab.ch/\_api/lists
- http://oceanic.csnclab.ch/\_api/lists/?\$select=Title
- http://oceanic.csnclab.ch/\_api/lists/getbytitle('Passenger%20List')
- http://oceanic.csnclab.ch/\_api/lists/getbytitle('Passenger%20List')/title
- http://oceanic.csnclab.ch/\_api/lists/getbytitle('Passenger%20List')/Items
- http://oceanic.csnclab.ch/\_api/lists/getbytitle('Passenger%20List')/Items?\$sele ct=Title
- http://oceanic.csnclab.ch/\_api/lists/getbytitle('Passenger%20List')/Items?\$sele ct=Title,Credit\_x0020\_Card\_x0020\_No

## Raw in browser (e.g. chrome):





### **REST Chrome Apps like Dev HTTP Client, Postman – REST Client:**



## **Cause: Misconfiguration**



#### The Lockdown Feature:

- prevents access to /\_vti\_bin and /\_layouts folders
- removes the Remote Interface Permissions for anonymous users

## But there is an important flag on two separate locations, which overrules the Remote Interface Permission if set wrongly

#### Site Content Content and Structure Documents Form Templates Images ■ News Pages Passenger List Pictures

Client Object Model Permission Requirement

You can require that users must have the Use Remote Interfaces permission in order to use the Client Object Model to access the server, which is used by some parts of the UI. Enabling this prevents users from performing some tasks using the UI if they do not have the Use Remote Interfaces permission.




## **Cause: Misconfiguration**



## **#1: Authentication Provider (Web Application Settings)**




## #2: Anonymous Access Configuration (Site Permissions)



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## Mitigation I – Remote Interface Perm.






## Mitigation II – List Permissions



If you need CSOM for some client side features like search or other highly dynamic Ajax features:

==> Explicitly deny access for Anonymous Users on "hidden" lists







## **Hardening Considerations**

Server-Side Controls, Sandboxing and further hardening recommendations

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## **Server-Side Controls**



# Make sure that only controls from trustful sources are in the list of safe ASP.NET controls in the web.config:

- → Dangerous controls which should not be usable within .aspx pages are marked as Safe="False" by default.
   (E.g. controls allowing the execution of server-side code or similar)
- → Controls / Web Parts marked as Safe="True" can be used in .aspx pages (whitelisting).

```
<SafeControl ... TypeName="*" Safe="True" SafeAgainstScript="False" ... />
<SafeControl ... TypeName="ListViewWebPart" Safe="True" SafeAgainstScript="True" ... />
<SafeControl ... TypeName="XsltListViewWebPart" Safe="True" SafeAgainstScript="True" ... />
<SafeControl ... TypeName="ImageWebPart" Safe="True" SafeAgainstScript="True" ... />
<SafeControl ... TypeName="SqlDataSource" Safe="False" SafeAgainstScript="False" />
<SafeControl ... TypeName="Xml" Safe="False" SafeAgainstScript="False" />
<SafeControl ... TypeName="DataViewWebPart" Safe="False" SafeAgainstScript="False" />
...
```

# ==> The list of default controls should only be extended with a very good reason!

## .NET Sandbox



# Make sure that only trustful code (Web Parts / ASP.NET Controls) deployed with a Full Trust Level

### **Global Assembly Cache:**

- → Runs with a full trust level
- → Can be used by every SharePoint Web Application
- → Assemblies are signed and need to be installed by an Administrator

## Bin directory of Web Application:

- → Runs with the trust level WSS\_Minimal (<= SP 2010)</p>
- → Only available to that single Web Application
- → Can be deployed by everyone with write access to that directory
- Developers need to explicitly specify which privileges their code need (CAS polices)

## .NET Sandbox



With SharePoint 2013, Microsoft changed the default trust level of code in the Bin directory to full trust!

```
<trust level="Full" originUrl="" legacyCasModel="true" />
```

- ==> Only allow 3<sup>rd</sup> party code which is reviewed and trusted to run with a full trust level
- ==> Try to change trust level back to WSS\_Minimal
- ==> Use Sandboxed Solutions or Apps if possible

## Sandboxed Solutions / Apps



#### **Sandboxed Solutions:**

- → Run isolated in the User Code Service in a dedicated process
- Running under a very strict CAS policy only allowing a minimum of calls

## Apps:

- ★ Are hosted in an isolated SharePoint site, farm or either in the cloud
- ★ Are not allowed to use server-side code
- Need to use the client object model to connect back to the SharePoint farm

#### **Best Practices:**

- → Only deploy trusted code (Farm Solutions) to the GAC or the Bin directory
- → 3<sup>rd</sup> party developers should use Sandboxed Solutions or Apps
- Sandbox solutions are deprecated but are still working in SharePoint 2013
- Use SharePoint Apps for 3rd party code in SharePoint 2013

## Hardening Recommendations



Is SharePoint Designer disabled?

Are unnecessary or suspicious features disabled?

Is Self-Service Site Creation disabled?

Check the list of blocked file types?

Check the Web Part gallery, which really need to be used?

Is the Developer Dashboard disabled?

Is the Audit Log configured properly?

Is HTML Field Security configured properly (SP 2013)?


Who are your Site Collection Administrators?

## Hardening Recommendations



Do we use a proper architecture for our deployment?

## Split back-to-back







## Conclusion

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## SharePoint 2010+ by default secure



-> Do not misconfigure!



## Do not trust 3<sup>rd</sup> party code (e.g. Web Parts)



- -> Wrong declarations in web.config?
- -> XSS, CSRF and SQL Injection vulnerabilities?






## Quiz and Q&A

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## How much do you still know?



## **Questions**







- Allow or prevent Contributors ability to edit scriptable Web Parts <a href="http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh272820">http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh272820</a>
- Are you Safe Against Script?
   <a href="http://www.bluedoglimited.com/SharePointThoughts/Lists/Posts/Posts.aspx?ID">http://www.bluedoglimited.com/SharePointThoughts/Lists/Posts/Posts.aspx?ID</a>
   =303
- Web Sensitive Files and SharePoint 2010 <a href="http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2483447">http://support.microsoft.com/kb/2483447</a> <a href="https://www.nothingbutsharepoint.com/sites/itpro/Pages/Web-Sensitive-Files-and-SharePoint-2010.aspx">https://www.nothingbutsharepoint.com/sites/itpro/Pages/Web-Sensitive-Files-and-SharePoint-2010.aspx</a>
- SharePoint Security Best Practices: Cross-Site Request Forgery <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/gg552614.aspx#bestpractice\_crossrequest">http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/gg552614.aspx#bestpractice\_crossrequest</a>
- Security Validation and Making Posts to Update Data <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms472879.aspx">http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms472879.aspx</a>



- → Plan security for an external anonymous access environment http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc263468.aspx
- How to lock down external anonymous access SharePoint sites http://blogs.technet.com/b/vedant/archive/2009/07/13/locking-downsharepoint-sites.aspx
- Deciding Which SharePoint 2010 API to Use <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh313619%28v=office.14%29.aspx">http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/hh313619%28v=office.14%29.aspx</a>
- Programming using the SharePoint 2013 REST service <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fp142385.aspx">http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fp142385.aspx</a>
- Understanding and Programming with SharePoint Web Services
   http://de.slideshare.net/newsteplearning/understanding-and-programming-with-sharepoint-web-services
- ★ Basic operations with the SharePoint .NET client object model <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fp179912.aspx#BasicOps">http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/fp179912.aspx#BasicOps</a> SPCSOMOps



- Choose the right API set in SharePoint 2013
  <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj164060.aspx">http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj164060.aspx</a>
- Safe Controls list <a href="http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc261736#BKMK">http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc261736#BKMK</a> SafeControls
- Security for SharePoint Solutions
   <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee696753.aspx">http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee696753.aspx</a>
- Configure and deploy Web Parts
   http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc261736
- Microsoft Windows SharePoint Services and Code Access Security http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms916855.aspx
- What to do? Farm solution vs Sandbox vs App http://sharepointdragons.com/2012/09/03/sharepoint-2013-what-to-do-farmsolution-vs-sandbox-vs-app/



- Using the Developer Dashboard <a href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff512745.aspx">http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff512745.aspx</a>
- SharePoint Hacking Diggity Project
   <a href="http://www.stachliu.com/resources/tools/sharepoint-hacking-diggity-project/">http://www.stachliu.com/resources/tools/sharepoint-hacking-diggity-project/</a>
- Research for SharePoint (MOSS)
   <a href="https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Research for SharePoint %28MOSS%29">https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Research for SharePoint %28MOSS%29</a>

**+** ...



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